oleh
SEKRETARIAT KEADILAN
& PERDAMAIAN
KEUSKUPAN JAYAPURA
JAYAPURA
December 2001
KEUSKUPAN
JAYAPURA DIOCESE
OF JAYAPURA
KOTAK
POS 1379 Tel: +62 - 967 - 534993
JAYAPURA
9901 Fax: +62 - 967 - 534993
INDONESIA E-mail:
sekkp@jayapura.wasantara.net.id
Jayapura, December, 2001 No.: 210/TB/01/3.1.2.
In overviewing the situation in Papua in
2001, some very striking elements appear that could be regarded as determining
events for the year. The main elements
are:
v
the effort to articulate people’s
aspirations into a concept of special autonomy,
v
a number of bloody incidents, culminating
the murder of the chairman of the Presidium (PDP), Mr Theys Eluay,
v
the efforts and failures to get previous
incidents handled by the judiciary,
v
the drawn-out court case related to
prominent PDP members,
v
the increasing deployment of security
forces in the area, and
v
the developments at the national level.
In this paper we will try to explore one
of these main elements, ie “special autonomy”.
For sure it will represent a quite limited analysis, as well as a personal
valuation of what has happened in the time span of a year. Any comments, including differences of view
are most welcome.
1. THE ORIGINAL IDEA
It might be useful to recall that the
offer of ‘autonomy’ had been made by the central government since the very
beginning of increasing protests by the Papuan community in 1998. It was offered by the government to counter
the people’s demand for freedom and independence. A similar offer has been
addressed to the Aceh Regency, another regency in the Indonesian Republic which
is looked at as a problem-area.
The offer to the Papua Regency was
[1] created on the officially
urged opinion in governmental circles that problems in Papua were mainly
problems originating from the failure of development policy in the region,
[2] inspired by the – in the
government’s view – indisputable fact that Papua is and always will be a part
of the Indonesian Republic, and
[3] based on the fact that
autonomy would be granted anyway, as part of a nation-wide program to give more
authority to the regional administration.
As the official government’s valuation of
the problems in Papua (mainly development-related) was not shared by leading
persons in the independence movement – and by a large circle of other people as
well[1]
– the offer of ‘autonomy’ failed clearly to satisfy the Papuan community, and was
simply looked upon as an effort to deny the real problems at hand. Moreover the
government made very clear that any room for a political discussion or dialogue
was out of question. In no way was it possible to discuss openly the actual
political status of Papua as an integral part of the Indonesian Republic. Given
this situation the concept or just the word ‘autonomy’ popularly became
identified with “any attitude or person opposing the real aspirations of the
Papuan community”, slowly pushing people into two polarising blocs: the
independence group (M-group) versus the autonomy group (O-group).
Over the period 1999-2000 the government
seemed totally deaf to the protests directed at the ‘autonomy concept.’ This
attitude was finally and very embarrassingly demonstrated by the DPRD (Regional
House of Representatives in Papua), which – in December 2000 – simply endorsed
the articulation of the autonomy concept as it has been offered by the central
government. Although the DPRD officially invited some input before endorsing
the suggested articulation of the concept, it never took the input seriously
and made no changes at all to the formulation suggested by ‘Jakarta.’
2. FROM ‘AUTONOMY’ TO
‘SPECIAL AUTONOMY’
Facing increasing pressure and protests
by various circles and realising that ‘autonomy’ would be introduced anyway,
the Governor, Mr Jaap Salossa, took the initiative to get the concept better
articulated and more reflective of the aspirations of the Papuan community.
Already the year before he had pleaded to the central government to grant Papua
not just ‘autonomy’ (uniform for any province in the Indonesian Republic and
introduced by 1 January 2001), but to grant ‘special autonomy’ in order to make
it more responsive to the special situation of Papua. The central government
gave him room for such a move, but that room failed to be used by the DPRD.
Building on his earlier effort the
Governor decided to ask the regional university, UNCEN (Universitas Cenderawasih),
to get involved and to develop a more appropriate concept of ‘special
autonomy’. The university had to move fast as the concept had to be ready to be
handed to the central government before 1 May 2001. So roughly three months
were available to do the job.
3. ARTICULATING
SPECIAL AUTONOMY: A COMMISSION AT WORK
The governor appointed a commission to
assist the UNCEN staff. A variety of organisations (including NGOs and
religious institutions) were represented in the commission. The main function of the commission was to
‘throw’ suggestions at the working team and to comment on provisional results.
One of the important stages in the
process was a visit to the various districts by the members of the working
group, in order to explain the purpose of the work they had been asked to do,
and make clear that input from the local communities was vital to that job. The
results of these field visits were eye-opening for the commission because, on
one hand, they experienced very close to their skin that there was increasing
opposition to anything related to ‘autonomy’; and, on the other, they had a
keen opportunity to feel what people were really looking for.
At the same time it should be mentioned
that in a number of districts the working group hardly got a chance to dialogue
with the ‘local community,’ as the meeting was just a gathering of civil
servants who happened to be at hand.
Although the visiting phase didn’t meet completely the expectations of
the commission, it did provide a basis for understanding the main issues that
the “special autonomy concept” should deal with.
The commission also searched for input
from the Presidium of the Papuan Council (PDP), but this board of leaders
preferred to keep strictly to their mandate given by the Papuan community – ie,
to aim for independence – so they were reluctant to get involved in any
discussion on autonomy.
4. CIRCUMSTANTIAL
SOCIO-POLITICAL SETTING
During the initial sessions of the
commission’s deliberations with the supporting commission, it had been made
clear that any credibility the “special autonomy” offer may have would depend
heavily on very clear changes in the social-political setting in Papua as
such. Attention was drawn to the fact
that core leaders of the PDP were still in jail, that bloody incidents had
still to be investigated, that increasing security presence and actions didn’t
support the ‘good intentions by the government’, etc. Some signals of improvement were delivered: a special independent team was set up to
investigate the Abepura case; the security forces refrained from very open
actions; and the PDP-members were released from jail and put on house arrest.
5. RESPONDING TO BASIC
ASPIRATIONS
Everyone involved in the process of
articulating the ‘special autonomy’ concept became aware of the fact that it
had to respond to the aspirations voiced over the last years, if it was to have
a chance at being accepted by the Papuan community. The commission worked from one draft to another and ended with a
concept that breathed fresh hope and perspective. Some features especially
related to the struggle of the Papuan community over the last two years were
found in a number of substantial paragraphs, such as:
v
Respect for local socio-cultural
expressions, including the freedom to fly the Papuan flag, and sing the
community’s ‘national’ anthem (Ch. II and XI) [2]
v
An effective say in political decisions,
ie in relation to migration and the deployment of security forces (Ch. IV)
v
Representation of local traditional
leadership in the administration (Ch. V)
v
Obtaining a major share of the profit
from the exploitation of natural resources (Ch. X)
v
An opening to a political dialogue on the
past (‘rectification of history’) (Ch. XII, Art. 43)
v
Attention for justice to be done and
human rights violations to be halted (Ch. XII)
v
The request for a referendum to be held
in the event that special autonomy is not implemented properly (Ch. XXIII, Art.
75)
6. AN OPEN FORUM FOR
FINAL DISCUSSIONS
Before finalising its work the commission
decided on a final input via a workshop that would gather representatives from
all over Papua. Accordingly the “Forum
Kajian R.U.U. Otonomi Khusus menuju Papua Baru”[3]
was held on 28-29 March 2001. As this congress can be regarded as a major event
of 2001 we will report on it at length here (as an intermezzo below). This
short reflection we have written a day after the Forum took place.
Over the last few days Jayapura has been
tuned to the "special autonomy meeting," which began on Wednesday, 28
March 2001. In the preceding days, long sessions by the steering committee
continued to update the discussion paper. The draft bill for Special Autonomy
to be granted to Papua has been formulated; it is the 11th edition,
which has been handed to the participants of the Congress. Besides the ‘legal
draft,’ a list of recommendations[4]
has been drawn up reflecting aspirations of the people; unavoidably a quite
politically loaded document. In a number of meetings with the steering
committee it has been stressed that the recommendations should be an
inseparable part of the whole document on special autonomy; the recommendations
deal with items that can be applied straight away and should restore the trust
of the people in its government, while the substantial legal document as such
is at risk of being subject to discussions for months (if not years).
The
concept as presented is quite balanced and reflects the effort the UNCEN
commission has made to establish a bridge between the struggle/movement in
Papua over the last two years and what can be obtained politically and
practically at this very moment. For insiders the concept represents a step
(not the final one!) in the long-term strategy to deal with the “Papua
problem,” including the openness to a political dialogue. This last element is
assured in the concept wherein a special Committee has been proposed to deal
with the rectification of history. Similar terms have been put in to deal with
human rights violations in the past, as well nowadays and in the future. In the
concept special attention is given as well to the role of traditional
leadership in the Papuan community, trying to integrate it into the legislative
and administrative structure proposed. As such the concept is of a good
quality, and the UNCEN team did a very responsible and ‘neutral’ job trying to accommodate
the real aspirations of the people.
Looking
back to the events over the last days, it has become clear – in my opinion –
that too little time was available for more socialisation of the draft; this
lack has been paid for quite dearly. On Wednesday (28 March 2001) the congress
opened; present: 28 representatives of each district, totalling a bit more than
400 people. In front of the building some demonstration was going on by about
150 people carrying banners and shouting their protest, but not hindering
anyone who was meant to take part in the meeting, and even greeting them
joyfully, while at the same time protesting. So the atmosphere wasn’t really
aggressive, and the protests were valued as just normal and acceptable. The
opening ceremony was of a high quality, giving participants a chance to get the
feeling and understanding why they came and what task lay ahead. In both
speeches (by the rector of the university and governor) a realistic picture was
given and no overdone promises were made.
After
the opening ceremony, things ran out of hand as a big group of people (mainly
students together with members of the Papuan Council/Panel – the figure
estimated: 500 people) forced its way into the meeting hall and started giving
their opinion, which in effect meant rejecting the autonomy discussion
completely. (I had left the meeting hall 10 minutes before it happened.) So the
situation became tense; the police (all around the building) fired some warning
shots and got into a clash with a number of people (which by the next morning
had resulted in the death of one protester in the provincial hospital because
of the injuries he suffered while being trampled in the clash with the police
the day before); the situation outside was taken control of by the police quite
fast and left some destroyed tents/ shelters and broken chairs as silent
witnesses of what had happened minutes before. Inside the building the
protesters were given time to voice their protest; after being listened to,
they were invited by the organising body to stay on and listen as well to the
explanation about the Contents of the Special Autonomy as drafted by the UNCEN
team, and which was scheduled to be discussed. The protesters refused that
offer and invited everybody who agreed with them to walk out; roughly a bit
more than a third of the “official delegates” joined the walk-out (and didn’t
show up for discussions the next day). The protesters left the place and made a
long march to Abepura (about 20 kilometres from the meeting hall). Although there was a victim to be mourned
and some limited material damage was done, in general the protesters were
clearly interested in only a peaceful protest and acted that way once they were
in the meeting hall.
The
meeting was held up for a couple of hours, and then continued with the people
still present; explanation was given (by ex-governor and nowadays Indonesian
Ambassador in Mexico, Mr. Bas Suebu) about the background and Contents of the
concept of special autonomy, and after that the district heads (Bupati) were
asked to get together with their people, the officially invited ones as well as
the protesting ones (if possible) of their district, and try to come up with
some 'message' for the meeting the next day.
The
next morning every district reported on the results of its discussions. Most of
the delegations present went along with basics of the concept as offered by the
UNCEN team, while adding points to be taken care of, but at least one third of
the delegates there the day before didn't show up again, and at the time might
be protesting together with the student group in Abepura (at the UNCEN
complex).
Late
in the afternoon the congress closed without further disturbance. There was a
rumour that people planned to bring the corpse of the deceased protester to the
meeting hall. But at the end that seemed to have been prevented; by whom and
how is not clear. Concerning this same matter it is quite remarkable (even more
than that!) that no visible protest was staged after the message came through
that a casualty of the clash had died in the hospital; once again it is not
clear why this (expected) protest didn’t materialise.
Having
obtained the input by all the delegations as reported on above, the UNCEN team
set itself to work once more, to accommodate the input into another draft again
and to work slowly toward the final draft, which will be presented to the
central administration in Jakarta by 1 May.
Overlooking the whole event I think that an
opportunity to get the people's aspirations into the open via a respected
institution like the University has been substantially spoiled. I tend to see
this as a setback, as the university team working on this issue had drawn up a
rather balanced paper, especially as they complemented the 'legal draft' with a
list of recommendations that included almost all the demands over the last two
years; meaning that they included the call for a political dialogue to
rectify Papua's history (an item included in the legal concept of the autonomy
paper as well).
I
have the impression that its work has been rejected mainly because people who
voiced their refusal didn’t really take notice of or didn’t understand fully
what was meant to be achieved, and limited themselves to just opposing “special
autonomy” to “freedom/ independence” (which has been normal practice over the
last two years). The negative reaction of “simply ignoring or refusing” might
also have been a remote result of the Second Papuan Peoples Congress in
May-June 2000. During the Congress the importance of “going international”
(obtaining international understanding and support) as well as the refusal of
any autonomy-offer (as the opposite of the demand for independence) were
heavily stressed and propagated. This emphasis resulted in an attitude of too
easy relying on “foreign powers” to save Papua and marked the “domestic
dynamics” as completely untrustworthy.
This kind of easy polarisation might have
been prevented if more time had been available to socialise the draft that was
made after a number of working group members went to the various districts to
get the people’s voice. An outstanding failure in the socialisation process (if
there was any) is the fact that even the student community at the UNCEN complex
had not been involved in previous discussions; their involvement at an earlier
stage might have prevented a lot of misunderstanding. It has been repeatedly
stated (in the speech by the rector of the university, as well in the speech by
the governor) that this was not a final stage, but just a step within the whole
process of dealing with the real aspirations of the Papuan people.
7. THE JAKARTA PROCESS
Once the draft bill was handed over to
the DPR-RI, a difficult lobbying game started in Jakarta.
First, there was the issue of whether
this new concept would be the very base of the discussions in the DPR-RI, or
whether it would lose out against the one that had been presented way back in
December. There was a real danger that
exactly the last would happen, and the new draft would only be handed out as a
kind of additional explanation. Therefore the Governor with the UNCEN team
decided to have an almost permanent lobby group in Jakarta to get the new draft
accepted as the only draft to be discussed.
In the end they succeeded in getting the new draft through, which might
be seen as a relatively major success.
At the same time we have to conclude from
a number of comments in the press, mainly made by the Governor, that the hard
core of the new draft is its demand for greater economic returns (70% or 80% of
the revenue from exploitation of natural resources)[5].
This emphasis confirms once again that for the government the problems in Papua
are mainly focused on as “development problems”. In stressing the economic dimension of the draft as the most
substantial part, the door was opened wide for the DPR-RI to curtail the
remainder of the draft while advancing the economic content.
We note this change in accentuation as we
think it doesn’t honour the real effort made by the UNCEN group to get a wide
scope of people’s aspirations included in the concept, and to handle it as a
comprehensive document. We expect that it will be proved a mistake to reduce
the problems in Papua once again to the mere failure of a development policy,
and to make people in ‘Jakarta’ believe that as well. Once again an opportunity
to make the central government more familiar with the real problems in Papua
might have been spoiled.
Effective discussion in the DPR-RI began
in September and ended with the endorsement of the Special Autonomy for Papua
on 22 October 2001.
8. CHANGES MADE
It might be helpful to have a summarising
look at the significant changes (exclusively related to changes in contents) made
in the process from original draft to the approved document.
Comparing the original draft and the
final document, the Chapter in the original draft dealing with “Court Authority
and Police” has been split into two in the final document (one on the Police,
and one on Court Authority). In the
following overview we will use the Chapter’s indication as used in the final
document.
|
Chapter |
Topic |
Draft |
Final Doc. |
Changes |
Comment |
|
Preface |
Cultural identity |
Art. e |
Art. e |
Contents[6] |
Substantial |
|
|
Development policy |
Art. f |
Art. f |
Contents[7] |
Weakened |
|
|
Own policy |
Art. h |
Art. h |
Contents[8]
|
Restrictive |
|
|
Name |
Ch. II , 2 |
Art. k |
Contents[9] |
Redaction |
|
References |
|
5 ref. |
15 ref. |
Contents[10]
|
Additional |
|
Ch. I |
General |
Art. a |
Art. a |
Contents[11]
|
Restrictive |
|
|
|
Art. g |
Art. h |
Contents[12] |
Restrictive |
|
|
|
Art. s |
Art. t |
Contents[13]
|
Enlarging |
|
Ch. II |
Symbols |
None |
Art. 2.1. |
Contents[14]
|
Substantial |
|
|
|
Art. 2.2. |
Art. 2.2. |
Contents[15]
|
Restrictive |
|
Ch. III |
Regional division |
Art. 5.4 |
Art. 3.4. |
Contents[16]
|
Restrictive |
|
Ch. IV |
Regional authority |
Art. 6.1. |
Art. 4.1. |
Contents[17] |
Restrictive |
|
|
|
Art. 6.4. |
Art. 4.8. |
Contents[18] |
Restrictive |
|
Ch. V |
Regional government |
Art. 8.1. |
Art. 5.1., 6.1. & 20 |
Contents[19]
|
Substantial |
|
|
|
None |
Art. 10, 14 & 23 |
Contents[20]
|
Substantial |
|
Ch. VI |
Civil service |
|
|
|
|
|
Ch. VII |
Political party |
|
|
|
|
|
Ch. VIII |
Special rules or
laws |
|
|
|
|
|
Ch. IX |
Finances |
Art. 32.2. |
Art. 34 |
Contents[21]
|
Detailed |
|
Ch. X |
Economy |
Art. 36.1. |