oleh
SEKRETARIAT KEADILAN
& PERDAMAIAN
KEUSKUPAN JAYAPURA
JAYAPURA
December 2001
KEUSKUPAN
JAYAPURA DIOCESE
OF JAYAPURA
KOTAK
POS 1379 Tel: +62 - 967 - 534993
JAYAPURA
9901 Fax: +62 - 967 - 534993
INDONESIA E-mail:
sekkp@jayapura.wasantara.net.id
Jayapura, December, 2001 No.: 210/TB/01/3.1.2.
In overviewing the situation in Papua in
2001, some very striking elements appear that could be regarded as determining
events for the year. The main elements
are:
v
the effort to articulate people’s
aspirations into a concept of special autonomy,
v
a number of bloody incidents, culminating
the murder of the chairman of the Presidium (PDP), Mr Theys Eluay,
v
the efforts and failures to get previous
incidents handled by the judiciary,
v
the drawn-out court case related to
prominent PDP members,
v
the increasing deployment of security
forces in the area, and
v
the developments at the national level.
In this paper we will try to explore one
of these main elements, ie “special autonomy”.
For sure it will represent a quite limited analysis, as well as a personal
valuation of what has happened in the time span of a year. Any comments, including differences of view
are most welcome.
1. THE ORIGINAL IDEA
It might be useful to recall that the
offer of ‘autonomy’ had been made by the central government since the very
beginning of increasing protests by the Papuan community in 1998. It was offered by the government to counter
the people’s demand for freedom and independence. A similar offer has been
addressed to the Aceh Regency, another regency in the Indonesian Republic which
is looked at as a problem-area.
The offer to the Papua Regency was
[1] created on the officially
urged opinion in governmental circles that problems in Papua were mainly
problems originating from the failure of development policy in the region,
[2] inspired by the – in the
government’s view – indisputable fact that Papua is and always will be a part
of the Indonesian Republic, and
[3] based on the fact that
autonomy would be granted anyway, as part of a nation-wide program to give more
authority to the regional administration.
As the official government’s valuation of
the problems in Papua (mainly development-related) was not shared by leading
persons in the independence movement – and by a large circle of other people as
well[1]
– the offer of ‘autonomy’ failed clearly to satisfy the Papuan community, and was
simply looked upon as an effort to deny the real problems at hand. Moreover the
government made very clear that any room for a political discussion or dialogue
was out of question. In no way was it possible to discuss openly the actual
political status of Papua as an integral part of the Indonesian Republic. Given
this situation the concept or just the word ‘autonomy’ popularly became
identified with “any attitude or person opposing the real aspirations of the
Papuan community”, slowly pushing people into two polarising blocs: the
independence group (M-group) versus the autonomy group (O-group).
Over the period 1999-2000 the government
seemed totally deaf to the protests directed at the ‘autonomy concept.’ This
attitude was finally and very embarrassingly demonstrated by the DPRD (Regional
House of Representatives in Papua), which – in December 2000 – simply endorsed
the articulation of the autonomy concept as it has been offered by the central
government. Although the DPRD officially invited some input before endorsing
the suggested articulation of the concept, it never took the input seriously
and made no changes at all to the formulation suggested by ‘Jakarta.’
2. FROM ‘AUTONOMY’ TO
‘SPECIAL AUTONOMY’
Facing increasing pressure and protests
by various circles and realising that ‘autonomy’ would be introduced anyway,
the Governor, Mr Jaap Salossa, took the initiative to get the concept better
articulated and more reflective of the aspirations of the Papuan community.
Already the year before he had pleaded to the central government to grant Papua
not just ‘autonomy’ (uniform for any province in the Indonesian Republic and
introduced by 1 January 2001), but to grant ‘special autonomy’ in order to make
it more responsive to the special situation of Papua. The central government
gave him room for such a move, but that room failed to be used by the DPRD.
Building on his earlier effort the
Governor decided to ask the regional university, UNCEN (Universitas Cenderawasih),
to get involved and to develop a more appropriate concept of ‘special
autonomy’. The university had to move fast as the concept had to be ready to be
handed to the central government before 1 May 2001. So roughly three months
were available to do the job.
3. ARTICULATING
SPECIAL AUTONOMY: A COMMISSION AT WORK
The governor appointed a commission to
assist the UNCEN staff. A variety of organisations (including NGOs and
religious institutions) were represented in the commission. The main function of the commission was to
‘throw’ suggestions at the working team and to comment on provisional results.
One of the important stages in the
process was a visit to the various districts by the members of the working
group, in order to explain the purpose of the work they had been asked to do,
and make clear that input from the local communities was vital to that job. The
results of these field visits were eye-opening for the commission because, on
one hand, they experienced very close to their skin that there was increasing
opposition to anything related to ‘autonomy’; and, on the other, they had a
keen opportunity to feel what people were really looking for.
At the same time it should be mentioned
that in a number of districts the working group hardly got a chance to dialogue
with the ‘local community,’ as the meeting was just a gathering of civil
servants who happened to be at hand.
Although the visiting phase didn’t meet completely the expectations of
the commission, it did provide a basis for understanding the main issues that
the “special autonomy concept” should deal with.
The commission also searched for input
from the Presidium of the Papuan Council (PDP), but this board of leaders
preferred to keep strictly to their mandate given by the Papuan community – ie,
to aim for independence – so they were reluctant to get involved in any
discussion on autonomy.
4. CIRCUMSTANTIAL
SOCIO-POLITICAL SETTING
During the initial sessions of the
commission’s deliberations with the supporting commission, it had been made
clear that any credibility the “special autonomy” offer may have would depend
heavily on very clear changes in the social-political setting in Papua as
such. Attention was drawn to the fact
that core leaders of the PDP were still in jail, that bloody incidents had
still to be investigated, that increasing security presence and actions didn’t
support the ‘good intentions by the government’, etc. Some signals of improvement were delivered: a special independent team was set up to
investigate the Abepura case; the security forces refrained from very open
actions; and the PDP-members were released from jail and put on house arrest.
5. RESPONDING TO BASIC
ASPIRATIONS
Everyone involved in the process of
articulating the ‘special autonomy’ concept became aware of the fact that it
had to respond to the aspirations voiced over the last years, if it was to have
a chance at being accepted by the Papuan community. The commission worked from one draft to another and ended with a
concept that breathed fresh hope and perspective. Some features especially
related to the struggle of the Papuan community over the last two years were
found in a number of substantial paragraphs, such as:
v
Respect for local socio-cultural
expressions, including the freedom to fly the Papuan flag, and sing the
community’s ‘national’ anthem (Ch. II and XI) [2]
v
An effective say in political decisions,
ie in relation to migration and the deployment of security forces (Ch. IV)
v
Representation of local traditional
leadership in the administration (Ch. V)
v
Obtaining a major share of the profit
from the exploitation of natural resources (Ch. X)
v
An opening to a political dialogue on the
past (‘rectification of history’) (Ch. XII, Art. 43)
v
Attention for justice to be done and
human rights violations to be halted (Ch. XII)
v
The request for a referendum to be held
in the event that special autonomy is not implemented properly (Ch. XXIII, Art.
75)
6. AN OPEN FORUM FOR
FINAL DISCUSSIONS
Before finalising its work the commission
decided on a final input via a workshop that would gather representatives from
all over Papua. Accordingly the “Forum
Kajian R.U.U. Otonomi Khusus menuju Papua Baru”[3]
was held on 28-29 March 2001. As this congress can be regarded as a major event
of 2001 we will report on it at length here (as an intermezzo below). This
short reflection we have written a day after the Forum took place.
Over the last few days Jayapura has been
tuned to the "special autonomy meeting," which began on Wednesday, 28
March 2001. In the preceding days, long sessions by the steering committee
continued to update the discussion paper. The draft bill for Special Autonomy
to be granted to Papua has been formulated; it is the 11th edition,
which has been handed to the participants of the Congress. Besides the ‘legal
draft,’ a list of recommendations[4]
has been drawn up reflecting aspirations of the people; unavoidably a quite
politically loaded document. In a number of meetings with the steering
committee it has been stressed that the recommendations should be an
inseparable part of the whole document on special autonomy; the recommendations
deal with items that can be applied straight away and should restore the trust
of the people in its government, while the substantial legal document as such
is at risk of being subject to discussions for months (if not years).
The
concept as presented is quite balanced and reflects the effort the UNCEN
commission has made to establish a bridge between the struggle/movement in
Papua over the last two years and what can be obtained politically and
practically at this very moment. For insiders the concept represents a step
(not the final one!) in the long-term strategy to deal with the “Papua
problem,” including the openness to a political dialogue. This last element is
assured in the concept wherein a special Committee has been proposed to deal
with the rectification of history. Similar terms have been put in to deal with
human rights violations in the past, as well nowadays and in the future. In the
concept special attention is given as well to the role of traditional
leadership in the Papuan community, trying to integrate it into the legislative
and administrative structure proposed. As such the concept is of a good
quality, and the UNCEN team did a very responsible and ‘neutral’ job trying to accommodate
the real aspirations of the people.
Looking
back to the events over the last days, it has become clear – in my opinion –
that too little time was available for more socialisation of the draft; this
lack has been paid for quite dearly. On Wednesday (28 March 2001) the congress
opened; present: 28 representatives of each district, totalling a bit more than
400 people. In front of the building some demonstration was going on by about
150 people carrying banners and shouting their protest, but not hindering
anyone who was meant to take part in the meeting, and even greeting them
joyfully, while at the same time protesting. So the atmosphere wasn’t really
aggressive, and the protests were valued as just normal and acceptable. The
opening ceremony was of a high quality, giving participants a chance to get the
feeling and understanding why they came and what task lay ahead. In both
speeches (by the rector of the university and governor) a realistic picture was
given and no overdone promises were made.
After
the opening ceremony, things ran out of hand as a big group of people (mainly
students together with members of the Papuan Council/Panel – the figure
estimated: 500 people) forced its way into the meeting hall and started giving
their opinion, which in effect meant rejecting the autonomy discussion
completely. (I had left the meeting hall 10 minutes before it happened.) So the
situation became tense; the police (all around the building) fired some warning
shots and got into a clash with a number of people (which by the next morning
had resulted in the death of one protester in the provincial hospital because
of the injuries he suffered while being trampled in the clash with the police
the day before); the situation outside was taken control of by the police quite
fast and left some destroyed tents/ shelters and broken chairs as silent
witnesses of what had happened minutes before. Inside the building the
protesters were given time to voice their protest; after being listened to,
they were invited by the organising body to stay on and listen as well to the
explanation about the Contents of the Special Autonomy as drafted by the UNCEN
team, and which was scheduled to be discussed. The protesters refused that
offer and invited everybody who agreed with them to walk out; roughly a bit
more than a third of the “official delegates” joined the walk-out (and didn’t
show up for discussions the next day). The protesters left the place and made a
long march to Abepura (about 20 kilometres from the meeting hall). Although there was a victim to be mourned
and some limited material damage was done, in general the protesters were
clearly interested in only a peaceful protest and acted that way once they were
in the meeting hall.
The
meeting was held up for a couple of hours, and then continued with the people
still present; explanation was given (by ex-governor and nowadays Indonesian
Ambassador in Mexico, Mr. Bas Suebu) about the background and Contents of the
concept of special autonomy, and after that the district heads (Bupati) were
asked to get together with their people, the officially invited ones as well as
the protesting ones (if possible) of their district, and try to come up with
some 'message' for the meeting the next day.
The
next morning every district reported on the results of its discussions. Most of
the delegations present went along with basics of the concept as offered by the
UNCEN team, while adding points to be taken care of, but at least one third of
the delegates there the day before didn't show up again, and at the time might
be protesting together with the student group in Abepura (at the UNCEN
complex).
Late
in the afternoon the congress closed without further disturbance. There was a
rumour that people planned to bring the corpse of the deceased protester to the
meeting hall. But at the end that seemed to have been prevented; by whom and
how is not clear. Concerning this same matter it is quite remarkable (even more
than that!) that no visible protest was staged after the message came through
that a casualty of the clash had died in the hospital; once again it is not
clear why this (expected) protest didn’t materialise.
Having
obtained the input by all the delegations as reported on above, the UNCEN team
set itself to work once more, to accommodate the input into another draft again
and to work slowly toward the final draft, which will be presented to the
central administration in Jakarta by 1 May.
Overlooking the whole event I think that an
opportunity to get the people's aspirations into the open via a respected
institution like the University has been substantially spoiled. I tend to see
this as a setback, as the university team working on this issue had drawn up a
rather balanced paper, especially as they complemented the 'legal draft' with a
list of recommendations that included almost all the demands over the last two
years; meaning that they included the call for a political dialogue to
rectify Papua's history (an item included in the legal concept of the autonomy
paper as well).
I
have the impression that its work has been rejected mainly because people who
voiced their refusal didn’t really take notice of or didn’t understand fully
what was meant to be achieved, and limited themselves to just opposing “special
autonomy” to “freedom/ independence” (which has been normal practice over the
last two years). The negative reaction of “simply ignoring or refusing” might
also have been a remote result of the Second Papuan Peoples Congress in
May-June 2000. During the Congress the importance of “going international”
(obtaining international understanding and support) as well as the refusal of
any autonomy-offer (as the opposite of the demand for independence) were
heavily stressed and propagated. This emphasis resulted in an attitude of too
easy relying on “foreign powers” to save Papua and marked the “domestic
dynamics” as completely untrustworthy.
This kind of easy polarisation might have
been prevented if more time had been available to socialise the draft that was
made after a number of working group members went to the various districts to
get the people’s voice. An outstanding failure in the socialisation process (if
there was any) is the fact that even the student community at the UNCEN complex
had not been involved in previous discussions; their involvement at an earlier
stage might have prevented a lot of misunderstanding. It has been repeatedly
stated (in the speech by the rector of the university, as well in the speech by
the governor) that this was not a final stage, but just a step within the whole
process of dealing with the real aspirations of the Papuan people.
7. THE JAKARTA PROCESS
Once the draft bill was handed over to
the DPR-RI, a difficult lobbying game started in Jakarta.
First, there was the issue of whether
this new concept would be the very base of the discussions in the DPR-RI, or
whether it would lose out against the one that had been presented way back in
December. There was a real danger that
exactly the last would happen, and the new draft would only be handed out as a
kind of additional explanation. Therefore the Governor with the UNCEN team
decided to have an almost permanent lobby group in Jakarta to get the new draft
accepted as the only draft to be discussed.
In the end they succeeded in getting the new draft through, which might
be seen as a relatively major success.
At the same time we have to conclude from
a number of comments in the press, mainly made by the Governor, that the hard
core of the new draft is its demand for greater economic returns (70% or 80% of
the revenue from exploitation of natural resources)[5].
This emphasis confirms once again that for the government the problems in Papua
are mainly focused on as “development problems”. In stressing the economic dimension of the draft as the most
substantial part, the door was opened wide for the DPR-RI to curtail the
remainder of the draft while advancing the economic content.
We note this change in accentuation as we
think it doesn’t honour the real effort made by the UNCEN group to get a wide
scope of people’s aspirations included in the concept, and to handle it as a
comprehensive document. We expect that it will be proved a mistake to reduce
the problems in Papua once again to the mere failure of a development policy,
and to make people in ‘Jakarta’ believe that as well. Once again an opportunity
to make the central government more familiar with the real problems in Papua
might have been spoiled.
Effective discussion in the DPR-RI began
in September and ended with the endorsement of the Special Autonomy for Papua
on 22 October 2001.
8. CHANGES MADE
It might be helpful to have a summarising
look at the significant changes (exclusively related to changes in contents) made
in the process from original draft to the approved document.
Comparing the original draft and the
final document, the Chapter in the original draft dealing with “Court Authority
and Police” has been split into two in the final document (one on the Police,
and one on Court Authority). In the
following overview we will use the Chapter’s indication as used in the final
document.
|
Chapter |
Topic |
Draft |
Final Doc. |
Changes |
Comment |
|
Preface |
Cultural identity |
Art. e |
Art. e |
Contents[6] |
Substantial |
|
|
Development policy |
Art. f |
Art. f |
Contents[7] |
Weakened |
|
|
Own policy |
Art. h |
Art. h |
Contents[8]
|
Restrictive |
|
|
Name |
Ch. II , 2 |
Art. k |
Contents[9] |
Redaction |
|
References |
|
5 ref. |
15 ref. |
Contents[10]
|
Additional |
|
Ch. I |
General |
Art. a |
Art. a |
Contents[11]
|
Restrictive |
|
|
|
Art. g |
Art. h |
Contents[12] |
Restrictive |
|
|
|
Art. s |
Art. t |
Contents[13]
|
Enlarging |
|
Ch. II |
Symbols |
None |
Art. 2.1. |
Contents[14]
|
Substantial |
|
|
|
Art. 2.2. |
Art. 2.2. |
Contents[15]
|
Restrictive |
|
Ch. III |
Regional division |
Art. 5.4 |
Art. 3.4. |
Contents[16]
|
Restrictive |
|
Ch. IV |
Regional authority |
Art. 6.1. |
Art. 4.1. |
Contents[17] |
Restrictive |
|
|
|
Art. 6.4. |
Art. 4.8. |
Contents[18] |
Restrictive |
|
Ch. V |
Regional government |
Art. 8.1. |
Art. 5.1., 6.1. & 20 |
Contents[19]
|
Substantial |
|
|
|
None |
Art. 10, 14 & 23 |
Contents[20]
|
Substantial |
|
Ch. VI |
Civil service |
|
|
|
|
|
Ch. VII |
Political party |
|
|
|
|
|
Ch. VIII |
Special rules or
laws |
|
|
|
|
|
Ch. IX |
Finances |
Art. 32.2. |
Art. 34 |
Contents[21]
|
Detailed |
|
Ch. X |
Economy |
Art. 36.1. |
Art. 39 |
Contents[22]
|
Restrictive |
|
Ch. XI |
Traditional rights |
Art. 39 |
Art. 43 |
Contents[23] |
Restrictive |
|
Ch. XII |
Human rights |
Art. 41 |
Art. 45 |
Contents[24]
|
Restrictive |
|
|
|
Art. 42 |
None |
Details[25]
|
Omitted |
|
|
|
Art. 43 |
Art. 46 |
Contents[26]
|
Restrictive |
|
Ch. XIII |
Police force |
Art. 47 |
Art. 48, 49 |
Contents[27]
|
Substantial |
|
Ch. XIV |
Court authority |
Art. 45 |
Art. 51 |
Contents[28]
|
Restrictive |
|
Ch. XV |
Religion |
|
|
|
|
|
Ch. XVI |
Education &
culture |
|
|
|
|
|
Ch. XVII |
Health |
|
|
|
|
|
Ch. XVIII |
Population |
Art. 55 |
Art. 61 |
Contents[29]
|
Substantial |
|
Ch. XIX |
Development environment |
|
|
|
|
|
Ch. XX |
Social |
|
|
|
|
|
Ch. XXI |
Supervision |
None |
Art. 68 |
Contents[30]
|
Substantial |
|
Ch. XXII |
Co-operation |
|
|
|
|
|
Ch. XXIII |
Transition |
Art. 68 |
Art. 75 |
Contents[31]
|
Restrictive |
|
|
|
Art. 69 |
None |
Contents[32]
|
Omission |
|
Ch. XXIV |
Epilogue |
Art. 70 |
Art. 76 |
Contents[33]
|
Substantial |
|
|
|
None |
Art. 78 |
Contents[34]
|
Additional |
|
|
|
Art. 74, 75 |
None |
Contents[35]
|
Omission |
9.
AN OVERVIEW
Overviewing
the significant changes as summarised above we might conclude:
First
of all it becomes clear that in the final
document the basic assumption is that Papua is and always will be an integral
part of the Indonesian Republic. The final document leaves no doubt as to that
matter.
Secondly,
in line with this basic assumption, the demand for open research into the
history of Papua is virtually made impossible; the nomination (by Jakarta) of a
“Commission for Truth and Reconciliation” (CTR) doesn’t serve properly the need
for an open-ended political dialogue. It might even be concluded that setting
up a CTR as viewed by the government is not really meant to open up the truth,
but mainly meant to strengthen the national unity. Herewith the CTR loses its
original principal contents and purpose.
Thirdly,
a similar remark relates to another important element: the Human Rights
Commission. Also this one is mainly put under the central government’s control.
Fourth,
the real position of the MRP (‘House of Lords’) is kept very ambiguous, and the
impression is given that it will end up being more a part of ‘window-dressing’
rather than of a ‘decision-making body’.
Fifth,
the display of ‘local symbols’ is restricted to expressing ‘cultural identity’
only. This will trigger heavy discussion in the future, and leaves the
possibility open for the security forces to act when they value that the
symbols are used otherwise. The restriction to ‘expression of cultural
identity’ effectively makes a spontaneous display of local symbols a very risky
matter.
Sixth,
the supervising role of the central government is quite ambiguous as the use of
‘repression’ is granted within this context.
Seventh
to implement the “special autonomy law” a
great deal of work must be done to translate the ‘principles’ into concrete
regulations (regional laws). Within this process a lot can change or move away
from what is originally opted for. The need for an extensive as well as
intensive social control is very real to prevent a situation whereby in the end
the regulations just serve certain interest-groups.
Although
a number of important changes have been made (and could be expected to be
made), the Special Autonomy Law still leaves ample room for a new role for the
Papua people in future socio-political decisions, on condition
that the new law is implemented properly. It might help substantially to
improve matters such as education, health care, local economy; it might help
also to realise a better and more visible respect for local traditions, and for
all the daily display of respect for the dignity of the Papua people. It might help to improve the situation of
respect for human rights and to lead perpetrators to court. But as to the need
for justice to be done it should be noted that the Judiciary Body as agreed in
the final document leaves a lot of doubts as to its effectiveness.
So,
the least that can be said is the fact that the Special Autonomy bill, if
implemented correctly, will create new room for ‘freedom’ in relation to
well-being (economics; education; health; local needs) and in relation to human
rights (participation; respect for people’s identity; traditional rights; local
aspirations).
The
Special Autonomy bill offers little room towards an open-ended political dialogue,
and therefore fails to address one of the three main components of “the call
for political freedom”.
10.
THE CALL FOR FREEDOM/INDEPENDENCE: a “THREE in ONE”-model
The
impact of Special Autonomy as briefly pictured above is connected to the way we
interpret and look at the call for freedom/independence in Papua. In trying to
understand the breadth of the contents of that call, we can distinguish (not
separate!) three components in that call: [1] a political component, [2] a
social-cultural component, and [3] a development (economical and others)
component. The three components are heavily interrelated and therefore
appropriately can be valued as “Three in One”.
To
be more specific, we will dwell a little longer on this basic
concept/understanding. Listening to people with regard to
“freedom/independence” covers three worlds of interests:
v
the awareness of the fact that the Papuan
people have never had a fair and free chance to determine their own fate.
Within that context the event of 1969 (Act of Free Choice) is looked on as a
shameful and illegal event, violating International Law. It becomes more and
more clear that the Papuans are not alone in that opinion[36].
Based on this awareness there is the call for “rectification of history” and in
more extreme terms, the call for an independent state. This is the political
component of the “Three in One”-model.
v
the collective experiences of the Papuan
people. These experiences include the
fact of not being considered and respected as real human beings; to be looked
upon as objects for projects (which often only benefit the project-holder);
being regarded as an ‘enemy of the state’; living in fear (of the security
forces); being intimidated; the denial of freedom of speech and gathering; the
denial of human dignity. Therefore the
call for freedom/ independence includes the call for an end to all forms of
oppression and violation of human rights. It includes the call for justice to
be done. This is the socio-political-cultural component of the “Three in
One”-model.
v
the lack of a development policy, which
is able to raise the well-being of the local Papuan community. The centralised policies as implemented
didn’t respond to the local needs, and mainly benefited external parties. The valuation
is widely accepted and even seen by the government as the main source of the
problems in Papua. For sure it is an important element, but for sure as well
not the only – or even the most important – source of the problems. This
development component is the third component in the “Three in One” model.
Given
the above model of analysis, the Special Autonomy will provide a possibility
for real improvement on at least two of the abovementioned components of the
call for freedom/ independence (socio-political-cultural and development), and
only marginally –if at all- responds to the third component (political).
11.
MOVING BEYOND A PARALYSING POLARISATION
Although
only partially responding on the whole comprehensive “Three in One”-model, it
is still worthwhile to benefit from Special Autonomy, and it shouldn’t be
seen as the “opposite of the call for freedom/ independence”, but for what
it is: a partial response, but still a real response.
It
leaves all room open, or even invites an intensified rightful demand for political dialogue, as well as for justice to
be done effectively; it doesn’t exclude these aspects from being peacefully
struggled for, for the simple reason that it fails to address them properly.
There
will be no final comprehensive solution without these – the opening for an open
political dialogue, and for effective justice - and that reality should be
understood by anyone who tries to understand honestly what the real problems
are in Papua.
Accepting
Special Autonomy might help everybody to leave behind the model of
paralysing polarisation into O (Autonomy) and M (Idependence), and
might really help to put the peaceful call for freedom/independence, included
the call for justice and an open political dialogue in its rightful perspective.
Director SKP/Office for
Justice & Peace, Jayapura
Within the context of building up and establishing
strong bases for dialogue and reconciliation between the government of the
Indonesian Republic and the Papua people, the “Forum for Discussion on the
Special Autonomy Law, moving to a New Papua” recommends to the Government of
the Indonesian Republic in Jakarta to:
v Show readiness and open up for the
realisation of a national and international dialogue involving the Papua people
in order to find a solution to the difference of opinion in relation to the history
of integration of Papua into the Indonesian Republic; the dialogue should be
based on the principles of honesty, justice, truth, respect of human rights and
international law.
v Release all Papuan political prisoners
without condition as a first concrete step towards reconciliation between the
people and the government.
v Empower the whole regional police force in
the Papua Regency to execute optimally their tasks in enforcing just law, and
withdraw the nonorganic army- (TNI) and police-units (Brimob/Mobile Brigade) in
order to establish a “Zone of Peace” in Papua.
v Speed up the formation of a Judiciary Body
for basic Human Rights in the Papua Regency within the context of addressing
fully (secara tuntas) human rights violations and the allocation of
compensation and rehabilitation to the victims and their hereditaires.
v Grant the opportunity as freely as possible
to the indigenous Papuans and their descendants who for the time being reside
abroad and who desire to settle back home in the Papua Regency.
v Eliminate and do not use again any
word/concept that applies a negative stigma to all the efforts by Papuans to
demand their rights to be respected.
v Accept back with open arms, without legal
process, and while guaranteeing their well-being, all those OPM/TPN members who
opt to leave behind their armed struggle and choose to join the Papua community
in their political struggle to get their rights respected.
v Accept without changes and endorse the Special
Autonomy Concept that has been drafted by the Papua people to become a law as
soon as possible.
Appeal to the whole Papua community to value highly (menjunjung
tinggi) in their daily social life their traditions and customs (adat
istiadat) and proper Papuan behaviour (sopan santun orang Papua)
within the context of creating Tanah Papua as a zone based on peace and love.
Appeal to the whole Papua community in Tanah Papua as
well as to the government, army and police to respect human rights and value highly
democracy and the supremacy of law.
This recommendation
issued at Jayapura, Papua Regency, on the date….
Sydney Morning Herald Thursday, December 6, 2001
Letters: Legal
recognition
In responding to your editorial (Herald,
November 27) it is necessary to reiterate that Indonesia's sovereignty over
Papua is final and will always be so. First, an international legal principle
recognised this. The principle asserts that the boundaries of nascent
post-colonial countries conform to their pre-sovereign ones.
According to this principle, at the time
of proclamation of independence on August 17, 1945, Indonesia had automatically
become the legal successor to all territories, including West Papua, which
during colonial times was called the Netherlands East Indies.
The Dutch colonial power argument that
Papuans should be separated from the rest of Indonesia because they were
Melanesians is wrong since the Dutch recognised well that Indonesia is made up
of multi-ethnic societies, including many people of Melanesian origin, and in
larger numbers than those who reside in West Papua. If we support this
argument, then we believe that countries should be formed by one ethnic or
racial group, and that would undermine our multiracialism.
Second, it was only because the colonial
power ignored that international legal principle that the decolonisation of
Indonesia was not completed until Indonesia's sovereignty over Papua was
restored through the United Nations.
Lutfi Rauf, First Secretary (Information),
Indonesian Embassy, Yarralumla (ACT), November 27
Sydney Morning Herald December 7, 2001
Letters: Freedom
will come
In reply to Lutfi Rauf of the Indonesian
Embassy (Letters, December 6), even United Nations officials have now stated that
the referendum granting West Papua to Indonesia was rigged. It was a
disgraceful performance by the world body.
Futhermore, if it was acceptable for
Indonesia to want its freedom from the Dutch, why is it less valid for the West
Papuans to want their freedom?
Finally, nothing lasts forever,
eventually West Papua will be free.
John G. Way, Burraneer, December 6.
[1] See, among others, “Problems in Papua”, June 2000, an informative message from the Catholic Church leaders in Papua to President Wahid.
[2] The mentioned references
refer to the official conceptual document, which has been handed to the House
of Representatives of the Indonesian Republic (DPR-RI) to be considered and decided
on. The document is titled: “Rancangan Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia,
tentang Otonomi Khusus bagi Propinsi Papua”.
[3] “Forum for Discussion on the
Special Autonomy Law, moving to a New Papua”.
[4] See list of recommendations; Appendix 1
[5] see: Cepos, April 19th, 2001
[6] The original stresses that
the Papuan culture is rooted in the Melanesian pattern of culture and therefore
differs from most of the cultural identities in Indonesia. The final document
stresses first of all that the Papuan people are a part of the indigenous
peoples in Indonesia, before admitting that there is difference of culture,
language, tradition and history.
[7] There is slight difference in
appreciation: where the original draft states that the development policy “not
yet” favours the Papuan people on a number of aspects, the final document
weakens the statement by adding “not yet fully”.
[8] Where the original draft
states: the Papuans should have their own government; the final document applies a clear limit by stating “a special
policy is needed within the unity of the Indonesian Republic”.
[9] The final document adds an
Article as follows: “taken into account the situation and condition of the
Irian Jaya Regency, especially the aspirations of its people to get the name
Irian Jaya changed into Papua as expressed in the decision by the DPRD…”
[10] In the References section, a
number of official governmental decisions are mentioned. In the original,
5
references were included; in the final
one, 15. The original draft limited
itself to referring to the Constitution and some MPR decisions since 1998,
whereas the final document lists official decisions since 1962 besides
referring to the RI Constitution.
[11] While the original draft
states that “special autonomy” will be given to the Papua Regency, the final
document states the same, but adds: “within the context of a Unitary State of
the Indonesian Republic”.
[12] This Article deals with the
place of ‘an own flag’, ‘an own anthem’ and ‘logo’ (Mambruk bird [Crested
pigeon] instead of Garuda bird); while the original draft qualifies these
elements as “expressions of identity of the Papuan people”, the final document
values them as “cultural symbols” and explicitly refuses them as “symbols of independence”.
[13] In this Article a definition
is given determining who can be considered as indigenous Papua people. In the
final document the definition is enlarged: “Indigenous Papua people are the
people who originate from the Melanesian race in Papua-land who consist of
indigenous people in the Papua regency and/or people who have been accepted and
recognised as indigenous by the traditional community of Papua”. The part
in italics is an additional part in the final document.
[14] In the final document this
Article is added: “Regency Papua as a part of the Unitary State of the
Indonesian Republic uses the white-red flag as the national flag and Indonesia
Raya as the national anthem”.
[15] Both documents recognise the
right to use local symbols (flag and anthem), but in the final document the use
of these symbols is explicitly specified as “cultural expressions and cannot be used as independence symbols”. In the
final document the use of the Mambruk Bird as a regional symbol is omitted.
[16] In relation to changes, new
formation or restructuring of the administrative units in the regency, the
original draft states that the authority to do so should be in the hands of the
regency government. The final document changes this authority to the right
to propose these changes to the central Government, which at the end will
decide.
[17] The final document excludes
more fields from regional authorities than the original draft; the additional
excluded field is Religion.
[18] Where the original draft
provides for a “participating role by regional Parliament and Government” in
decisions about the deployment of security forces, the final document reduces
this role to a “coordinating function of the Governor” with the central
government.
[19] Although the original draft positions
the MRP (Majelis Rakyat Papua = comparable with the House of Lords, whose
members consist of traditional leaders and representatives of various
indigenous interest groups) as a part of the legislative body, the final
draft limits the legislative body to the DPRP (Papua House of Representatives).
Based on this principal allocation of position, a lot of changes are made in
relation to the original draft, which at the end might be summed up in the
difference between a ‘decision making’ position (DPRP) and a ‘consultation’
position (MRP). Nevertheless the MRP is given the authority to “agree or
refuse” decisions by the DPRP (Art. 20). So, the real MRP position isn’t that
clear. But it should be noted that the concept of a Parliament consisting of
two ‘houses’, which is launched in the original draft, is not found anymore in
the final document.
[20] In the final document an
Article is added concerning the obligations of the DPRP (Art. 10) and MRP (Art.
23), which stresses its obligation to “defend and care for the unity of the
State of the Indonesian Republic”; in the original draft there is no such an
Article concerning obligations of the DPRP. A similar addition is made under
the obligations of the Governor (Art. 14).
[21] In the original draft the
revenues from natural resources were just claimed without specification; the
final document details the revenues: 80% from forestry, 80% from fisheries, 80%
from mining in general (this might include Freeport mining and such?), while
70% from oil exploration and 70% from gas exploration. The 70% revenues from
oil- and gas exploration have to be spent partly (minimum 30%) on education,
and partly (minimum 15%) on health care. After 25 years the revenues from oil-
and gas exploration will be lowered to 50%.
[22] In the original draft it is
demanded that the processing of raw materials should be completely done in
Papua; in the final document this claim
has been weakened by making processing dependent on principles of a sound,
efficient and competitive economy.
[23] Both documents recognise the
traditional rights, such as those related to land, and any use of the land has
to be based on mutual agreement. However, the final document stipulates very
clearly that traditional rights are subordinated to national law and regulations.
Herewith it counters the more radical tune of the original document, which
claims recognition of almost absolute traditional rights on land and water with
all its richness.
[24] Both documents urge the
formation of a special Commission for Human Rights. The difference is found in
the official status (hence independent authority) they are willing to provide.
In the original draft a purely Papua-based and organised Commission is demanded,
while in the final document a branch-Committee under the official
National Commission for Human Rights is agreed on. In the final document the
Commission is meant to be set up by the central government, and not by the
Papua government (original draft).
[25] In the original draft a
special Article is inserted concerning the compensation for victims of human
rights violations in the past (since 1 May 1963); this aspect is omitted in the
final document.
[26] These Articles deal with a
very politically loaded issue, ie the ‘rectification of history’. In the
original draft, a “Commission for rectification of Papua’s history” under the
complete authority of the Papua government, is called for. In the final
document, a “Commission for Truth and Reconciliation” is agreed on, to be set
up by the central government after consultation with the Papua Governor.
Besides being under different authority, the formulation (in the final document)
of the Commission’s main task is “(1) to provide clarification of Papua’s
history in order to strengthen the people’s unity in the State of the
Indonesian Republic, and (2) to formulate and decide on steps towards
reconciliation”. In the original draft the task of the “Commission for
rectification of Papua’s history” is not explicitly formulated, but the need
for the commission is put within the context of “reaching final and
comprehensive solutions related to the difference of opinion on the history of
integration of Papua into the Republic of Indonesia”. See also Appendix 2.
[27] Comparing the two documents,
the most striking change related to the police force is the fact that in the
original draft a police force under complete regional authority is asked for,
while in the final document a police force as integral part of the national
police force is agreed on.
[28] In both documents a role for
a “Pengadilan Adat” (Traditional Court) is recognised. In the original draft
the authority of this traditional court is only subordinated to the National
Court in case its decision violates human rights; in the final document the
functioning of the traditional court is sanctioned, but can be overruled by the
national court in the event that one of the conflicting parties opts for a
revised process at the national court.
[29] Within the demographic policy
it is demanded in the original draft to stop completely any transmigration
program; in the final document transmigration is still agreed on, be it only
with the approval by the Governor.
[30] Both documents deal with the
need for social control; the original document deals with it in very general
terms, while in the final document a special Article is inserted dealing with
the right of the central government to ‘supervise’ any decisions, regulations,
etc settled for on the regional level. Even the use of repression is granted to
the central government within this context (Art. 68.2). Especially the use of
the word ‘repressive’ in this final document suggests far-reaching authority
(including the right to overrule?) for the central government.
[31] This Article in both
documents sets a deadline for the effective implementation of the Special
Autonomy Law. While in the draft, a period of 5 years is recommended; in the
final document a period of 2 years has been agreed.
[32] This Article in the original
draft is completely omitted in the final document. The Article relates to the
work of the Commission for Rectification of History: “If the results of the
(Commission for) rectification of history show that the process of integration
of Papua into the Unitary State of the Indonesian Republic in the past doesn’t
accord with International Law in relation to the people’s right of
self-determination, the central government and the Papua people, via its
parliament, will take steps towards a solution”.
[33] While in the original
document any redivision of the region into more sub-regions is rejected, the
final document leaves that possibility wide open.
[34] While in the original draft a
periodic evaluation is not mentioned, the final document settles for a yearly
evaluation of the implementation, to start at the end of the third year.
[35] Both of these Articles in the original draft refer to the possibility of using a referendum. The referendum should be used when substantial changes in the Special Autonomy Law or the National Constitution are at stake (Art. 74), and in event that the Special Autonomy law proves not to be implemented effectively after 5 years, a referendum should be held “to determine the political attitude of the Papua people” (Art. 75). Both Articles haven’t got a place in the final document.
[36] Compare the comments recently
made by one of the persons very close to the event. "It was just a
whitewash. The mood at the United Nations was to get rid of this problem as
quickly as possible," said Chakravarthy Narasimhan, a retired UN
undersecretary-general who handled the takeover. "Nobody gave a thought to the fact that there were a million
people there who had their fundamental human rights trampled," he said
from his home in Madras, India.
"How could anyone have seriously believed that all voters
unanimously decided to join his [Soeharto's] regime?" Mr Narasimhan said.
"Unanimity like that is unknown in democracies."
Other former UN officials agreed. Brian Urquhart, another retired UN undersecretary-general, said: "It was arranged to have the UN put the seal of good housekeeping on the easiest but not necessarily most democratic way to resolve the problem."