List of supporting organisations

Briefing document

Letter to Kofi Annan

Letter to NGOs and others requesting support for campaign

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The following organisations support international calls on UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to review the UN's conduct in relation to the Act of 'Free' Choice in West Papua in 1968-1969':

West Papua Association - UK - wpauk@hotmail.com
Tapol, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign - UK - tapol@gn.apc.org
Australia West Papua Association -
Sydney iris@matra.com, Melbourne westpapua@start.com.au, Brisbane - pandai@bigpond.com
West Papua Action - Ireland - wpaction@iol.ie
KWIA - Flanders/Belgium - kwia@xs4all.be
West Papua Action Network (Wespan) - Canada - wespancanada@hotmail.com
Indonesia Human Rights Committee - New Zealand - maire@clear.net.nz
Survival International - France - survival@wcube.fr
PaVo - Papuan Peoples' Foundation - The Netherlands - pavo@planet.nl
International Platform of Jurists for East Timor (IPJET) - ipjet@antenna.nl
Pacific Peoples' Partnership - sppf@sppf.org
West Papuan Women Association in the Netherlands - insambern@hotmail.com
Oxford Papuan Rights Campaign - oprc@altavista.co.uk
Cambridge Campaign for Peace (CamPeace) - campeace@altavista.co.uk
Peace Movement Aotearoa, Aotearoa / New Zealand - pma@xtra.co.nz
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) Aotearoa Section, Aotearoa / New Zealand - joanmac@pl.net
"Children of Papua" ( Anak-Anak Papua ) - The Netherlands - j.jtrots@freeler.nl
Foundation Pro Papua, established by veterans former Dutch New Guinea - The Netherlands - dezijlstras@hotmail.com
German Pacific-Network - info@Pazifik-Infostelle.org
Regnskogsfondet - Oslo, Norway - rainforest@rainforest.no
West Papua Courier - The Netherlands - west_papua@hotmail.com
Peace Foundation - Aotearoa, New Zealand - marionh@clear.net.nz
Australian Greens Senator Bob Brown - senator.brown@aph.gov.au
Christian World Service - New Zealand - gsouthey@actrix.gen.nz
Organization of People for Indigenous Rights - rufoj@yahoo.com
Forest Peoples Programme - England - marcus@fppwrm.gn.apc.org
f P c N interCutural - UK - Office@fPcN-global.org
National Union of Students - UK - owain@nus.org.uk
The Foundation for Endangered Languages - England - nostler@chibcha.demon.co.uk
Disarmament & Security Centre - New Zealand - adrienne@disarmsecure.org
Just Forests - Ireland - woodlife@justforests.org
Icra International - International Commission for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples - icra@skynet.be
Alternatives to Violence - Belfast - avpbelfast@hotmail.com
Australian Greens - DebF@cyberone.com.au
Tibet Support Group - Ireland - tibetire@indigo.ie
Pacific Concerns Resource Centre (PCRC) - Fiji Islands - pcrc@is.com.fj
Anti-Racism Information Service - Switzerland - aris@antiracism-info.org
Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI) - Uganda - fhri@spacenetuganda.com
Swedish Association for a Free Papua - Sweden - batte52@hotmail.com
The Fellowship of Baptist Churches of West Papua - West Papua - tiom_wamena@hotmail.com
Intenational Volunteers for Peace - Australia - admin@ivp.org.au
Trócaire, the Catholic Agency for World Development - Ireland - sfranch@trocaire.ie
Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand - International.Secretary@Greens.org.nz
Medical Association for Prevention of War - Australia - mapw@mapw.org.au
Pax Christi, Australia - pax@paxchristi.org.au
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) - Denmark - iwgia@iwgia.org
Down to Earth - UK - dte@gn.apc.org
Afri - Ireland - afri@iol.ie
Movement for Peace, Human Rights, Communication and Development - Greece - keadea@otenet.gr
A SEED Europe, PO Box 92066, 1090 AB Amsterdam - Netherlands - peter@aseed.antenna.nl
East Timor Action Network (ETAN) - karen@etan.org - USA
British Parliament: Ann Clwyd MP - Chair, All-Party Parliamentary Human Rights Group; Jeremy Corbyn MP - Jnt. Vice-Chair; Lord Avebury - Jnt. Vice- Chair; Robert Walter MP- Jnt. Vice- Chair; Mark Oaten MP - Treasurer; Julie Morgan MP - Secretary, UK, PicheN@parliament.uk

Irish Parliament (TD = MP): Labour Party: Kathleen Lynch TD, Joe Costello TD, Tommy Broughan TD, Jan O'Sullivan TD, Mary Upton TD, Brian O'Shea TD, Liz McManus TD, Joan Burton TD; Green Party: Dan Boyle TD, John Gormley TD; Sinn Féin: Aengus Ó Snodaigh TD, Caoimhghin Ó Caolain TD; Independent TDs: Paudge Connolly TD, Tony Gregory TD, Finian McGrath TD.
Proinsias de Rossa, MEP.

BRIEFING re: call on Kofi Annan to review the UN's conduct in relation to the Act of 'Free' Choice in West Papua in 1968-1969

Background to the United Nations Involvement in West Papua (Irian Jaya)

Until October 1962, West Papua (Irian Jaya) was a non-self governing territory that was being prepared for eventual independence by the Netherlands.

However, Dutch policy in West Papua was strongly opposed by Indonesia's President Sukarno who claimed that, as a former part of the Dutch East Indies, the territory was Indonesian.

When diplomatic appeals to the UN General Assembly failed to win him sufficient support, Sukarno embarked upon a massive arms build up and threatened to take West Papua by force.

In September 1961, the Dutch presented a plan (the Luns Plan) to the UN General Assembly to resolve the dispute peacefully. They proposed to hand the territory over to a UN administration that would remain until the population was considered ready to exercise their right to self-determination. Although it won majority support, it fell short of the required two-thirds of votes to be passed.

With no solution agreed at the UNGA, the threat of an Indonesian attack on the territory grew. To avoid this the US put pressure on the Dutch to give in to most of Jakarta's demands and come to some form of UN-brokered agreement with them.

The result was the signing on 15 August 1962 of the New York Agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia.

In confidential communications, the Kennedy administration made clear the motivation behind its coercion of the Dutch. As one senior official advised the President on the day the Agreement was signed:

we ought to capitalise on the WNG settlement by moving fast toward the 'future fruitful cooperation' of which you spoke to Sukarno. Capital of the sort we've gained is a transitory asset to be used while it's still good. Moreover, Indonesia is one of the truly big areas of East-West competition; having invested so much in maneuvering a WNG settlement for the express purpose of giving us leverage in this competition, we'd be foolish not to follow through. [Komer. Memorandum to President Kennedy, 15 August 1962. In US Foreign Relations 1961-63, Vol XXIII Southeast Asia, (Department of State Printing Office, 1994), p. 626 - Enclosure 1]

Main points of the New York Agreement

Under the agreement, West Papua was to be handed over to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) for a minimum of 7 months. But unlike the Dutch plan, the UN was then permitted to transfer authority to Jakarta before any act of self-determination.

Nonetheless, the New York Agreement did give the Papuans certain rights.

Under Article 22, The UN and Indonesia had to guarantee fully the rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of assembly of the Papuans.

Under Article 18, all adult Papuans had the right to participate in an act of self-determination to be carried out in accordance with international practice.

Under Article 16, a number of UN experts were to remain in the territory following the transfer of administrative responsibility to Indonesia. Their primary task was to advise and assist the Indonesians in their preparations for Papuan self-determination that was to take place before the end of 1969.

Under Article 17, one year prior to self-determination, the Secretary-General was to appoint a representative who would lead a team of UN officials including those already stationed in the territory and additional staff as required. Their task was to continue and build on the work outlined in Article 16 and remain until the act of self-determination was complete.

Implementation of the New York Agreement

UNTEA 1962-63
Under the direct control of Under Secretary General Narasimhan, The United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) administered West Papua from 1 October 1962 to 1 May 1963 - the minimum period stipulated in the agreement. Indonesian military and civilian personnel were present in growing numbers throughout and there is much evidence in the UN archives and elsewhere to indicate that UNTEA's freedom to administer independently was severely restricted by Jakarta. As a result, Papuan rights and freedoms guaranteed under Article 22 suffered. In fact it seems that the UN's priority was simply to ensure that the Papuans acquiesced to whatever fate was decided for them, even if that meant abandoning the central tenet of the Agreement. As one senior UNTEA official privately reported:

if the date is advanced or if the Agreement is changed doing away with a plebiscite, I do not expect widespread disturbances because we have sufficient forces to control the situation - a whiff of grapeshot can easily control the situation if that is what UNTEA wants. [UN Archives: DAG 13/ 2.1.0.1:3. Report by D. Wilson (UNTEA Divisional Commissioner Merauke) to Somerville, 8 December 1962 - Enclosure 2].

Another senior UNTEA official made clear in his confidential reports that he was under no illusion as to the real state of affairs in the UN administered territory:

I have yet to meet any thinking, sober, generally responsible Papuan who sees good in the coming link with Indonesia….Unwelcome as the anxiety and resistance of thinking Papuans maybe it is of course hardly surprising if one is not under pressure to close one's eyes to what is in fact happening to this people at the hands of the three parties to the Agreement. [UN Archives: DAG 13/2.1.0.1:3. Report by Rawlings (UNTEA Divisional Commissioner Biak) to Somerville, 12 December 1962 - Enclosure 3]

Article 16
Following the transfer of administration to Indonesia, no UN officials were permitted to remain to fulfill Article 16's stipulations. As a consequence, this important part of the Agreement was never implemented. Because of this, there was no mechanism in place for the Secretary-General to be kept informed of the on-going situation in West Papua. This meant that with no international witnesses present, Indonesia was then able to completely ignore Article 22's provisions on human rights and political freedoms. The result of this state of affairs was commented upon by an American diplomat who was one of the few foreign officials permitted to enter the territory in early 1968. Reporting on the Indonesian response to Papuan resistance he noted:

The Indonesians have tried everything from bombing them with B.26's [sic], to shelling and mortaring them, but a continuous state of semi-rebellion persists. Brutalities are undoubtedly perpetrated from time to time in a fruitless attempt at repression. [Report of a conversation between Reynders, US Embassy, Jakarta, and Ian Morgan, British Embassy, Jakarta, April 9, 1968. Public Record Office UK. FCO 15/162. DH1/7 - Enclosure 4]

The Act of Free Choice
In August 1968, Fernando Ortiz Sanz arrived in West Papua as the Secretary General's representative to advise, assist and participate in Article 18's Indonesian-organized act of self-determination (known as the "Act of Free Choice"). He originally planned to have at least 50 UN staff on his team but, following pressure from Jakarta, the total never exceeded 16 (including administrative personnel). As Ortiz Sanz was to mention in his final report to the UNGA, the failure to implement Article 16 meant that he had no experienced staff ready on the ground to advise him when he arrived. As a consequence, he had only a few months to begin the task of gathering information with staff new to the territory - a job that should have already have been done over the previous 5 years.

While the UN had urged Australia as early as 1962 to adopt universal suffrage in Australian New Guinea (now the independent state of Papua New Guinea), Ortiz Sanz accepted Jakarta's argument that the West Papuans were "too primitive" to cope with a referendum. Instead he proposed a "mixed method" for the Act of Free Choice, which would allow direct voting in the towns while other areas would rely upon some form of "collective consultation". This, he privately warned Jakarta represented "the minimum requirement to satisfy world public opinion." [UN Archives: Series 100, Box 1, File 5: Ortiz Sanz to Indonesian Ambassador Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro, November 21,1968 - Enclosure 5]

Indonesia rejected this and instead announced that they would use existing regional councils (which had not been democratically elected) to decide on behalf of the people. Before the final vote, these councils were to have additional members selected so that a planned total of 1025 Papuans would eventually take part in the Act of Free Choice. With no plebiscite, the selection of these additional members was the only potential opportunity that the Papuan people had to have any genuine involvement in the Act of Free Choice.

This was acknowledged by both Ortiz Sanz and the Secretary-General who emphasized:

…the importance of electing the additional councilors in a way that would ensure that the new councilors would truly represent the people of their constituencies. This would be the touchstone in the judgment about the fairness and validity of the whole exercise which would be made by Member States of the United Nations. [UN Archives: DAG 1/ 2.2.3: 9: Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz (cable No. 250), May 9, 1969 - Enclosure 6]

But in the end the UN witnessed the selection of only 195 out of the 1022 members who eventually took part in the Act of Free Choice (The final total was supposed to be 1026 following a last minute addition. However during the actual Act of Free Choice, 4 did not participate "due to illness"). Furthermore there is evidence from witnesses that these selections were made solely by Indonesian officials with no genuine Papuan participation.

For example, an Australian journalist, Hugh Lunn reported that the selection he witnessed consisted of a group of Indonesians walking into a silent crowd of Papuans and choosing six men that they themselves had selected. He then described how Indonesian soldiers arrested three Papuans who displayed placards demanding a plebiscite. One journalist appealed to Ortiz Sanz to intervene, but he simply said that he was there just to observe [Hugh Lunn article in The Australian newspaper, August 21,1999 - Enclosure 7]. Elsewhere, two Papuans (Willem Zonggonao and Clemens Runawery) attempted to travel to New York to present a Papuan